so i've wondered for a long time about how leftists use the terms 'materialism' and 'idealism', and how it relates to those terms usage in broader philosophical discussions on epistemology.
i may be incorrect in my interpretations, but it seems to me that leftist uses of the term (even its usage in some of marx's writings, from what little i've read) are such that 'materialist' means 'understands that the material conditions of a society drive its development via dialectical processes' and that 'idealist' means 'focuses on artificial/socially constructed ethical or legal principles (such as 'freedom' and 'democracy' and 'rule of law' and 'free speech') rather than material conditions of society like quality of life, literacy, etc.'.
the broader philosophical definitions of these terms are slightly different, however.
epistemologically, a 'materialist' is someone who believes that we can (and do) directly apprehend the mind-independent external world. this is contrary to epistemological idealism, which argues that we can only ever know the contents of our own mind. we can use these contents to infer things about 'true reality' but can never truly verify them.
ontologically, materialism argues that all of reality can be described in terms of physics, or that all facts of the universe are causally dependent on or reducible to physical processes. this is again opposed to Idealism, which argues that existence is in some way irreducibly and fundamentally mental.
so my first question for you beautiful posters is, are my perceptions of these definitions and usages overall correct or incorrect? How exactly does Marx (or Engels or any other marxist philosopher) use these terms, and do they intend an epistemological, ontological, or other interpretation? am i missing something fundamental about the philosophical definitions or about the colloquial/leftist usage? What's the deal with that 'philosophy is pointless, the goal is to change the world' quote, is understanding reality not a benefit for efficiently manipulating it?
My next point, is that it seems to me like Marx and Engel's Dialectical Materialism, or at least the political program and methods of Socialism/Communism, are not necessarily at all incompatible with either philosophical Idealism or Materialism, in terms of epistemology or ontology. Neither is necessarily incompatible with basic empiricism, but is rather a difference in interpretation of what our empirical knowledge is. Whether reality is fundamentally mental or matter, it consists of opposing energies and dialectical processes that play out in our experience with the extrinsic appearance of physical matter. Whether the world is in the mind or 'really out there', our experiences of it are the same.
A bit ago i stumbled across this article that seemed to be making a similar point, a point i've never really seen made by anyone else before. I haven't read past the abstract yet, and It seems like someone random person's college dissertation or thesis or something so I'm probably not well read enough to interpret this without context, so i was wondering if anyone had seen any similar discourse? What would Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, or Mao say about this line of thought? is it a heresy against socialism, a useless detour into pointless philosophical questions that serve no practical purpose for the revolution, or is it something potentially useful in framing Marxism's relationship to epistemology and ontology?
Oh you might be interested in Popper's Three Worlds, it's the bit by him I find interesting.
Popper says that Darwinian Evolution is not a scientific theory, rather a metaphysical one with notable ontological commitments. I always thought ML was the same and the mechanics were, instead of Natural Selection, explained by Dialectical Materialism. Curious as to what you think.
To be honest i always confused Karl Popper with Steven Pinker (who i hate) whenever i read their names, so i've somehow avoided him so far, but from reading his wikipedia entry at least i find a lot that i could agree with. the Three Worlds thing reminds me of social constructivism, with socially created myths leading to new scientific theories and discoveries and eventually sometimes becoming falsifiable when before they were not. Like when we separate any particular part of the observed universe from another to analyze or name, we do that as a more or less conscious choice, made by people in cultures for reasons to accomplish goals.
You're just putting out all the bangers. Ok I have sympathies for antirealism, much of it is from the skepticism I more or less hold after reading David Hume and broadly agreeing with his is–ought problem and problem with induction.
Part of the problem with solipsism isn't that it's not tenable, that was never what I thought at least, more so it's not very productive. It would be difficult to discuss if the truth state or value of something corresponded solely internally to one or some other's mind.
I think there are flavours of antirealism which will have issues with Marxism & co. I guess the first questions I'd ask someone is:
Typically postmodernism, rationalism, obv. idealism are considered at odds with materialism and/or dialectical materialism. You might find some folks in older literature (Popper does this in his Open Society & other book, Conjectures & Refutations, where he refers to Marxism & co as historicism which I always understood to be a claim of relativism against Marxism & co; argument goes roughly like human rationality, liberty, independence, and propensity for novelty necessitates that there is no meaningful way to predict or shape the course of human societies; cool tidbit, Popper and Hayek were not fans of Behaviourism à la B.F. Skinner, incl. Friedman, where some Nobel Prizes in Economics [not the 'real' Nobel FYI] were awarded at that time behaviourism was being developed in some response to it; afterwards someone like Daniel Kahneman surprise surprise is an economist who includes tenets of behaviourism in his work AND hey, won a Nobel in Economics for it! Wow! what are the odds?)
well the thing is that i don't think I am a solipsist just because i'm an anti-realist? i believe that other people exist in some sense or form independently of my individual experience of them, i just don't think mind is reducible to physical processes in a way that doesn't lose meaning, and i don't think i can directly access that existence.
i would answer the questions as follows:
i do think that humans have a basis for intentionally shaping the development of human societies, the same way beavers have a basis for intentionally building dams, or birds have a basis for intentionally building nests, or monkeys have a basis for mourning their dead. we can do all that we are capable of, and we are apparently capable of shaping societies intentionally - the historical record shows this if nothing else, it is empirically verified that we can do it. so why artificially limit ourselves with arbitrary social constructs, when we could construct these social constructs in a way that can benefit us instead of leaving us victim to whoever happens to already be in charge? if we can do something, and it will be beneficial, we should. do bird ever ask if they are allowed to fly, if flight violates the principles of rationality, gravity, and the natural order? no - the bird, and any other animal including humans, on the specied level, develops and expresses any capacities it may have as fully as it is allowed to by its circumstances.
vis-à-vis scientific realism, here's my goto formulation from Godfrey-Smith's Theory & Reality. I noticed I forgot about the optimistic and pessimistic outlooks, hope you'll forgive me for that.
With comrade's in-person; I've honestly considered their takes vis-à-vis causality and morality and the assurance of knowing things to be reactionary. I never really found the opportunity to discuss with them. What was really frustrating was that they tended to make sweeping comments on scientific disciplines (usually the natural sciences) with which they were very poorly acquainted. I've taken courses (not that it means I know anything) but more so attended seminars at my institution and others (Royal Society, Salk, UC institutions, plenty of state schools; they don't actually check if you're a student or a prof or anything, you can just find events or newsletters and get the zoom/teams link and attend and ask questions!) with knowledgeable folks and premier experts with substantial evidence making quite modest claims with whom comrades would vehemently disagree.
^That is the stuff I tend to refer to as relativism (though it's not the standard way probably of using it...; often times folks who subscribe to postmodernism, i.e. there is no grand narrative nor truth which can be known, truth with a capital T can exist and humans simply do not have access it, are referred by rationalists and some realists as relativists)