this post was submitted on 13 Aug 2023
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I have forked a project's source code on GitHub. The program takes a private key as an input and that key must never leave the client. If I want to share a pre-built executable as a release it is essential that I can prove beyond reasonable doubt that it is built from the published source.

I have learned about how to publish the releases by using a Workflow in the GitHub actions such that GitHub itself will build the project and then repare a release draft with the built files as well as the file hashes..

However, I noticed that the release is first drafted, and at that point I have the option to manually swap the executable and the hashes. As far as I can tell, a user will not be able to tell if I swapped a file and its corresponding hashes. Or, is there a way to tell?

One potential solution that I have found is that I can pipe the output of the hashing both to a file that is stored and also to the publicly visible logs by using "tee". This will make it such that someone can look through the logs of the build process and confirm that the hashes match the hashes published in the release.

Like this:

I would like to know whether:

  • There is already some built-in method to confirm that a file is the product of a GitHub workflow

  • The Github Action logs can easily be tampered by the repo owner, and the hashes in the logs can be swapped, such that my approach is still not good enough evidence

  • If there is another, perhaps more standard method, to prove that the executable is built from a specific source code.

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[–] [email protected] 14 points 1 year ago (1 children)

There’s a paper from like 30 years ago about how you can never verify an executable because you don’t know that your compiler isn’t doing something nefarious. And if you do know that somehow, you don’t know it about it’s compiler, and so on. Scary a stuff.

[–] [email protected] 5 points 1 year ago* (last edited 1 year ago) (1 children)

Ooh, I think I found the paper!

Oof:

The actual bug I planted in the compiler would match code in the UNIX "login" command. The re- placement code would miscompile the login command so that it would accept either the intended encrypted password or a particular known password. Thus if this code were installed in binary and the binary were used to compile the login command, I could log into that system as any user

[–] [email protected] 3 points 1 year ago

That’s it! Thanks!