China

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4853883

[The article is an analysis of the cooperation agreement signed between Finland and China by two Finnish scholars.]

Geopolitical tensions were prominently featured in the discussions between the two heads of state [of Finland and China during Finland's president in Beijing this week]. In contrast to the laudatory tone of the Chinese media, the the Finnish President's official press release stated that the central topic of the talks was Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, as had been the focus of previous visits of EU leaders as well. [Finnish President] Stubb, who earlier stated [Chinese President] Xi could end the war in Ukraine with “just one phone call”, reportedly focused on convincing the Chinese president of the importance of the conflict for Finland and the rest of the European Union, emphasizing that Putin could not be trusted.

Yet apparently, China cannot be completely trusted either. Far from boosting cooperation, the New Joint Action Plan signed by Finland and China represents a reality different from the praises in Chinese media. Strikingly, the plan, which describes the main avenues of Sino-Finnish future cooperation, is only five pages long [and] the focal points of the plan give an impression of shrinking cooperation.

[...]

The Arctic domain is entirely absent from the new Sino-Finnish action plan. In contrast to the 2019 plan, which envisioned deepening Arctic cooperation in the fields of law, research and marine technology, the new plan does not mention the Arctic at all.

The omission is rather unsurprising. Since the signing of the 2019 plan, the Arctic security situation has changed dramatically and Finland’s Arctic projects involving Chinese stakeholders have been quietly cancelled or put on ice. Examples include the termination of the planned Arctic railway project connecting Norway’s Kirkenes and Rovaniemi, and the Finnish security authorities’ refusal to provide satellite services to China in the Arctic Space Center in Sodankylä or to rent an airport for Arctic research flights near the Finnish Defence Forces’ firing range in Kemijärvi.

[...]

This state of affairs reflects broader suspicion towards Chinese intentions, as the Finnish media have increasingly reported on the covert activities of Chinese “united front groups” and scholars with connections to military-civilian fusion projects, for instance. Finally, in 2023, a Chinese container vessel, on its way to St. Petersburg via the Arctic Northeastern passage, destroyed a gas pipeline linking Finland and Estonia. Before its ill-fated journey, the vessel, Newnew Polar Bear, was celebrated in the Chinese media as a harbinger of increased Arctic cooperation between China and Russia. Whether the incident was intentional or not (the investigation is still ongoing), it caused a flurry of media speculation on a possible Chinese grey-zone operation in the Baltic Sea.

Since officially launching its Polar Silk Road in 2017, China has attempted to expand its presence within the Arctic countries through economic, diplomatic and scientific cooperation, but it now seems that the Arctic leg of the Belt and Road is not extending to Finland or into its neighbouring Nordic countries either. Consequently, China's Arctic expansion now increasingly relies on Russia.

Finland’s distancing from Arctic cooperation with China reflects deeper dynamics than mere domestic concerns. As the great power competition between “democratic” and “authoritarian” camps intensifies, Finland is increasingly “de-risking” from China, while integrating with its Western partners.

[...]

Finland’s changed approach to China provides the latest example for the Chinese leadership that there is a price to be paid for its “strategic straddle”; attempting to maintain business-as-usual relations with Europe while de facto enabling a brutal invasion in Ukraine. Naturally, this straddle is most severely felt in Russian neighbour states, including Finland, which shares the longest border with Russia in Europe.

[...]

Symbolic of the deteriorating Sino-Finnish relations, two giant pandas leased to Ähtäri zoo by China in 2017 are set to return to China eight years ahead of schedule due to financial problems. One might ask whether this reflects a broader reality for China’s Arctic cooperation in the future?

Some create a routine where none exists by studying or applying for jobs in public spaces

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4768962

Ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Brazil visit on November 20, Brasilia has junked China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), becoming the second BRICS country after India to reject Beijing’s multi-billion dollar venture.

Earlier in December 2023, Italy, the only G7 country to have signed for BRI, also withdrew from China’s vast infrastructure initiative.

This move by Brazil—an influential player in the BRICS bloc—signals rising concerns about the long-term implications of China’s expanding global footprint through the BRI.

Prioritizing Strategic Autonomy

Under President Lula da Silva’s leadership, Brazil seeks to strengthen its ties with China while avoiding the formal commitments associated with joining the BRI.

Brazilian officials are actively pursuing Chinese investments without formal accession to the BRI, reflecting the country’s desire to maintain strategic autonomy while exploring various infrastructure and trade projects with China.

In an interview with the Brazilian newspaper O Globo, Celso Amorim, Brazil’s special presidential adviser for international affairs [...] clarified that Brazil does not view Chinese trade and infrastructure projects as “an insurance policy,” stating, “We are not entering into a treaty.”

[...]

A car attack that killed 35 people in China has sparked questions about a recent spate of public violence, as officials continue to censor discussion on the incident.

On social media, many are discussing the social phenomenon of "taking revenge on society", where individuals act on personal grievances by attacking strangers.

Police said the driver who ploughed into crowds at a stadium in the southern city of Zhuhai on Monday night acted out of unhappiness over a divorce settlement.

While it is believed to be China's deadliest known act of violence in decades, it follows a string of attacks in recent months, including a stabbing spree at a Shanghai supermarket and a knife attack at a Beijing school.

Amid a national outcry over the Zhuhai incident, President Xi Jinping has vowed "severe punishment" for the perpetrator. Police said the 62-year-old driver, who has been arrested, is in a coma due to self-inflicted wounds.

On Chinese social media platforms, many expressed shock at his actions and asked if it was a symptom of deeper societal problems.

One comment that went viral on Weibo read: "How can you take revenge on society because your family life is not going well? You've taken the lives of so many innocent people, will you ever have peace of mind."

“If there is a widespread lack of job security and huge pressure to survive... then society is bound to be full of problems, hostility and terror,” a user said on WeChat.

Another person wrote in a widely-shared post: "We should be examining the deep-rooted, social [factors] that have fostered so many indiscriminate [attacks on] the weak."

A number of violent attacks in China have been reported this year, including a mass stabbing and firearms attack in Shandong in February which killed at least 21 people.

In October, a knife attack at a top school in Beijing injured five people, while in September, a man went on a stabbing spree at a supermarket in Shanghai, killing three people and injuring several others.

"We keep on raising flags and complaining about it, but they keep on sending them," said President Surangel Whipps Jr, the pro-US leader re-elected this week.

"They continually don't respect our sovereignty and our boundaries and just continue to do these activities," he told AFP from Palau's commercial centre Koror.

The most recent foray was detected earlier this week, one day after claiming victory in presidential elections.

"Once again, Chinese vessels are in our exclusive economic zone uninvited."

In what appeared to be another deliberate prod, Chinese officials earlier this year bestowed new names on two underwater mountains already claimed by Palau, Whipps added.

"They're now naming some of our seamounts Chinese names. Why? Why would you do that?"

A nation of some 20,000 people, Palau is one of the few countries to recognise Taiwan's claim to statehood.

It is a stance that has angered China, which in recent years has persuaded a clutch of new Pacific friends to walk away from Taiwan in favour of Beijing.

[...]

[The article is originally published by AP.]

On the edge of Peru’s coastal desert [...] the megaport of Chancay, a $1.3 billion project majority-owned by the Chinese shipping giant Cosco, is turning this outpost of bobbing fishing boats into an important node of the global economy. China’s President Xi Jinping inaugurates the port Thursday during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Peru.

The development [...] has met a skeptical response from impoverished villagers, who say it is depriving them of fishing waters and bringing no economic benefit to locals.

“Our fishing spots no longer exist here. They destroyed them,” said 78-year-old fisherman Julius Caesar — “like the emperor of Rome” — gesturing toward the dockside cranes. [...]

The Peruvian government hopes the port 60 kilometers (37 miles) north of Lima will become a strategic transshipment hub for the region, opening a new line connecting South America to Asia and speeding trade across the Pacific for Peru’s blueberries, Brazil’s soybeans and Chile’s copper, among other exports. Officials cite the port’s potential to generate millions of dollars in revenues and turn coastal cities into so-called special economic zones with tax breaks to lure investment.

“We Peruvians are focused primarily on the well-being of Peruvians,” Foreign Minister Elmer Schialer told The Associated Press.

But many of Chancay’s 60,000 residents are unconvinced. Fishermen returning to port with smaller catches complain that they have already lost out.

The dredging of the port — which sucked sediment from the seabed to create a shipping channel 17 meters (56 feet) deep — has ruined fish breeding grounds, locals said.

“I’ve been out in the water all day and I’m always needing to venture farther,” said Rafael Ávila, a 28-year-old fisherman with sand in his hair, returning to shore empty-handed and exhausted.

“This used to be enough,” he said, pointing at his painted dinghy. “Now I need a larger, more expensive boat to reach the fish.”

[...]

With some of the world’s largest container ships to berth at Chancay Port in January 2025, residents also fear the arrival of pollution and oil spills. In 2022, a botched tanker delivery at La Pampilla refinery nearby sent thousands of barrels of crude oil spilling into Peru’s famously biodiverse waters, killing countless fish and putting legions of fishermen out of work.

Today a glance at the moribund town center, featuring mostly empty seafood restaurants, tells the story of diminished fishing stocks and decimated tourism even without the port being operational.

The port’s breakwater changed the currents and destroyed good surfing conditions, locals said, affecting everyone from ice vendors to truckers to restaurant owners. “No to the megaport” is spray-painted on a wall overlooking the waterfront.

“This port is a monster that’s come here to screw us,” said 40-year-old Rosa Collantes, cleaning and gutting slimy drum fish on the shore. “People come to the port and they say ‘Wow, tremendous!’ but they don’t see the reality.”

[...]

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4724783

China should face “a higher cost” for supporting Russia in the war against Ukraine, the EU’s incoming foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, has said.

The former Estonian prime minister was speaking to MEPs during a three-hour hearing before she takes office, when she listed Ukraine’s victory as a priority – stronger words than vaguer formulas of support voiced by some EU politicians.

“Victory of Ukraine is a priority for us all; the situation on the battlefield is very difficult,” Kallas told MEPs in her opening remarks. “That is why we must keep on working every day, today, tomorrow and for as long as it takes, and with as much military, financial and humanitarian aid as needed.”

[...]

Archived link

China seized the shoal, which lies west of the main Philippine island of Luzon, in 2012, and has since restricted access to Filipino fishermen there. A 2016 ruling by an international arbitration court found that most Chinese claims in the South China Sea were invalid but Beijing refuses to abide by it.

[...]

Tensions between China and the Philippines have been building over their competing claims to Scarborough Shoal and other outcrops in the South China Sea. Clashes have occurred including the Chinese coast guard firing water cannons at Filipino ships.

[...]

"What we see is an increasing demand by Beijing for us to concede our sovereign rights in the area," Manila's Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said after meeting Australian counterpart Richard Marles, adding that the Philippines was a "victim of Chinese aggression".

[...]

China claims almost the entire South China Sea, a conduit for more than $3 trillion of annual ship-borne commerce, including parts claimed by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

China has recently opened the so-called “Xinjiang Hotan Xueyuan (Institute)” in Hotan, as reported on November 10 by the official Chinese publication, Xinjiang Daily. According to the report, this full-time, government-controlled institution is the first of its kind in Hotan, aimed at increasing the influence of Chinese policies in the region.

[...]

Uyghur observers have expressed concern, suggesting that the institute’s real purpose is political rather than educational, with the institution serving as a tool for Chinese political agendas rather than providing meaningful benefits to the local Uyghur population. China chose the term “Xueyuan” (Institute) instead of the Uyghur term “Mektep,” or even the widely accepted English term “Institute.” This language choice is seen as part of China’s broader effort to erode the Uyghur language and culture.

[...]

Uyghur commentator Erkinjan said that “China’s investment in Hotan’s education is not out of genuine concern for Uyghurs. Rather, it aims to promote Chinese assimilation through education, strengthen the Party’s political propaganda, and cultivate individuals who will support China’s colonial control and governance of the Uyghur homeland.”

At least 35 people have been killed in a car attack in southern China, believed to be the deadliest known act of public violence in the country in decades.

Police say a man crashed his car into a stadium in Zhuhai on Monday where he ran down groups of people exercising on the sports track. At least 45 people - among them elderly and children - were reportedly injured.

While reporting about the attack, BBC China correspondent Stephen McDonell was angrily ordered to stop filming.

It is not clear who the man who tried to stop the reporting was, though when sensitive stories like this unfold in China, local Communist Party officials organise groups of cadres to pretend to be outraged locals who have been given the role of targeting foreign reporters so as to prevent any coverage.

Archived version

The report by Taiwanese fact checkers is directly relevant to the election campaign, the voting and counting process, the candidates, their family members, the political parties of the candidates, or policies promoted by the candidates.

[...]

The report examines 40 Chinese false information narratives propagated on social media or websites during the election campaign. We observed that:

1. False information narratives focused the most on attacks on candidates, followed by misrepresenting policies, spreading suspicions about the election's integrity, and instilling fear about the outcome of the election if a specific candidate was elected.

2. The most common tactic utilized in disinformation claims was to distort the original information.

3. Pictures were the most popular format. In addition, we identified several cases in which information manipulators promoted AI-generated videos or photos.

[...]

Most of [the disinformation] targeting Harris and her vice presidential candidate Walz, appeared to be popular among Chinese supporters of Trump, influencers who frequently ridiculed US politics and society, and those who enjoyed the drama of American election campaigns. The comments accompanying the false claims questioned Harris and Walz's beliefs and ethics, as well as the Democrats' immigration policies that made the US more unsafe and US foreign policies that often meddle with international events. They warned of the ramifications if Harris was elected as the US president, including a loss of freedom, of course, and presented false evidence that the Democrats may have committed voting fraud.

[...]

There was also a false claim about China's meddling. For example, one false piece claimed that Anthony Blinken, US Secretary of State, stated that China supplied fraudulent IDs to the US for those who were ineligible to vote in the presidential election. The truth was that Blinken never made the statement.

[...]

The majority of the false information pieces can be traced back to English social media posts. Some of them were even translated or adapted from X posts by Trump's allies, such as Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (who claimed that Harris wanted to shut X down) and Elon Musk (who promoted a video mocking Harris' campaign video).

One of the few exceptions was a piece suggesting Harris confirmed the US was involved in the killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. This false claim was made by an official account linked to the Chinese government, which referenced the Russian state outlet Sputnik as its news source. However, Harris has never made such a statement.

[...]p

This coercive practice, known as “distant water fishing” (远洋捕捞), involves poorer inland governments reaching beyond their jurisdictions to “catch” companies based in wealthier coastal provinces. They accuse them of fraud or other wrongdoing, freeze and confiscate their assets, and then compel them to pay large fines.

A government-run research organization earlier published a memo suggesting that nearly 10,000 companies operating in the city of Shenzhen and elsewhere in Guangdong Province have suffered such “cross-jurisdiction law enforcement.” That memo, meant for internal circulation, attracted widespread attention after it was published in part in an October media report.

[...]

A top economist, Zhou Tianyong (周天勇), had warned in late September that local governments across China have been extorting money from entrepreneurs using the Chinese Communist Party’s “disciplinary commissions.” These commissions, responsible for enforcing Party ideology and discipline, have detained entrepreneurs in their “liuzhi” detention system, where detainees are routinely tortured, intimidating them so they agree to pay the money demanded. Zhou’s post has since been deleted.

[...]

The Chinese government has sought to jumpstart its sputtering economy and restore business confidence by reiterating the Party’s support for private entrepreneurship.

But whatever reassurances the government may profess, in authoritarian systems where the laws are under the government’s control, nobody is truly safe.

[Edit typo.]

Archived link

During the 79th General Assembly of the United Nations, a joint statement was issued by the United States, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, calling attention to the situation in Tibet and East Turkistan.

In a statement, Kalon Norzin Dolma, Head of the Department of Information and International Relations, acknowledged the efforts of the coalition, particularly Australia, which led the initiative.

Dolma said, "On behalf of the CTA and Tibetans both in Tibet, and in exile, I extend our appreciation to the 15 nations and their leaders who have courageously raised their voices in support of justice, human rights, and peace. This gesture at the United Nations signifies solidarity and commitment to addressing the ongoing human rights abuses in Tibet".

[...]

Archived version

The Chinese leadership is reportedly considering offering tariff cuts, visa exemptions, and other incentives to U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. This strategy, termed “unilateral opening,” represents a shift from China’s traditional quid-pro-quo approach to economic and diplomatic deals.

Despite this, China faces resistance, with the European Union (EU) expressing discontent over China’s support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, are growing increasingly wary of China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea.

U.S. President-elect Trump promised to impose tariffs of up to 60% on Chinese imports poses a significant threat to Xi Jinping‘s economic model, which is heavily reliant on manufacturing and exports [due to China's structured overcapacity].

Archived version

In a joint statement, Lawyers for Lawyers, The Law Society of England and Wales (‘the Law Society’), Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada, Asian Lawyers Network, the International Bar Association Human Rights Institute, 29 Principles, The Rights Practice, and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) express grave concern about human rights lawyer and legal scholar, Dr Xu Zhiyong who is currently on hunger strike in Lunan prison, Shandong province in China.

Mr Xu started his hunger strike on 4 October 2024 to call attention to the inhumane treatment he is being subjected to in prison.

[...] Mr Xu is held in a cell with three other detainees who have been instructed by prison guards to monitor and torment him, even when he is using the toilet. In the prison, he is only referred to as “prisoner No. 003”, rather than his real name. His family have been granted access to visit him once a month. However, they have experienced threats and harassment which has prevented them from visiting. Furthermore, authorities have refused to deliver his letters to his family or his girlfriend Li Qiaochu, a feminist activist, and have not permitted him to contact them by phone.1 This activity violates China’s Prison Law (1994) and the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).

[...]

Archived link

[The article has been published before the U.S. election took place. For the article's content, this is not relevant.]

In the eyes of these Chinese American election volunteers, Kamala Harris is the perfect daughter of an immigrant family. “She is a successful person who has entered mainstream society, a microcosm of the American melting pot: mixed race, a former judge, an attorney general, and finally vice-president,” one volunteer said. “Her CV is what all of us Asians want to foster in our kids, and we Chinese want our next generation to be exactly like her.”

[...]

As we observed and analyzed simplified Chinese posts on X, WeChat Channels, and Douyin (TikTok), where discussions about Harris were concentrated, we found that Harris’s immigrant status and the life experiences of her parents remain important axes that “define” her on this side of the information ecosystem. Interestingly, however, we found that the very narrative that her supporters have tried to put front and center — that she is the exemplary daughter of an immigrant family — is entirely undermined in this ecosystem'

[Still, there are a significant number of Chinese Americans who do not speak English, and who might not have access to the “Harris Briefing” or to her campaign ads. For Mandarin speakers who use simplified characters in the US, if you are an X user, there is a good chance you will access election information sites in your native language].

In the vast majority of narratives we observed, the story portrayed was precisely the opposite: Harris is a disgrace to her immigrant family owing to her failure to excel, and to her alleged indiscretions in her private life. At the same time, the question of Harris’s femininity adds a further layer of complexity to these discussions. What does it mean to be the good daughter of immigrants? What makes a good politician? What makes a good woman?

[...]

**In this world [of Mandarin-speaking Chinese social media], Harris is known by another name — wu ji (烏雞), or “the black chicken” Meanwhile, her running mate, Minnesota Governor Tim Waltz, is called “Bai Feng,” or “white phoenix.” **Taken together, the first characters in these nicknames, “Wu” and “Bai,” allude to the fact the candidates are darker and lighter-skinned. Together, the two names also come very close to “Wuji Baifeng Wan,” the name of a proprietary Chinese medicine that claims to be “an all-purpose gynecological treatment.” To a certain extent, this coincides with Trump and his supporters calling Walz a “tampon man,” emphasizing the femininity of the Harris-Walz duo, while at the same time drawing the reader’s imagination to the female body and sexual organs. **The word “ji” (雞), the second character in this name for Harris, is even more obscene, directly linking it to the Chinese words for “chicken” and its homophone “prostitute” (妓). **

[...]

When it comes to specifics about Harris, Chinese-language posts tend to be very sparse in terms of real information content. A portion of the posts are simply re-posts of opinion pieces, screenshots, cartoons, and other content from English-language accounts, while the Chinese comments added are at once implicit and quite explicit. They are obscure in the sense that any observer unfamiliar with labels like “the black chicken” (烏雞), “goose giblets” (鵝雜), “Harry crap” (哈里屎), “tampon man” (棉條男), “white duck” (白鴨), “yellow left” (黃左), “mackerel” (​​鮁魚), and “fox” (狐狸), will imagine these are just some form of local dialect, or a secret code.

These words are extremely derogatory to both Harris and Walz. The term “goose giblets,” for example, is a derivation of the slang term “giblets” (杂碎), which can suggest someone is trash. Its pronunciation in Chinese somewhat resembles “Walz,” and so in this case it is used to insult the Democrats’ candidate for vice president. The term “yellow left,” derived from the term “white left” (not unlike the insult “liberal snowflake”), is an insult directed online at Chinese liberals.

[...]

Get past these odd words, though, and the messages inside these posts are the most basic and direct insults, ridicule and propaganda. A few are slightly more measured, like, “to reduce taxes and raise revenues, elect Trump; to increase taxes and get poorer, elect the cockerel.” But many are unmistakable personal and racist attacks: “If Columbus hadn’t discovered the New World, then there wouldn’t be a black chicken like her! Her father would have inherited his ancestral property and kept slaves in Jamaica, and her mother would have self-immolated and died for her husband.”

[...]

[For example], the WeChat channel “Country Road America” focuses on American politics. [...] Quite a number of these posts are about Harris as a woman. Several, posted under the name “Amber Kite” (琥珀風箏), go on and on with stories alleging Harris has used sex for career advancement:

>“When she was just in her 20s she became the mistress of a 60 year old married man (my dad isn’t even 31 years older than me, by the way) as she was looking for the first pot of money in politics from a California establishment figure who was a married man a generation older — it’s just amazing that almost half of Americans tout her as a ‘feminist icon.’” — The Democrats are about to be devoured! The leaders have hand-picked themselves. A descendants of a master poses as a member of the slave class, and a mistress represents women’s rights.

>[...]

>“Brown himself admitted that he had helped Harris get two high-paying jobs in the California state government, and that she made hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue in a few years, and that was 30 years ago. She had no background in the field, and Brown gave her a fancy car, the California version of the BMW.” — The First Bucket of Money for Harris, California’s BMW Woman. [NOTE: “BMW Woman” was a contestant on a Chinese dating show a decade ago, who famously said: “I’d rather cry in a BMW than laugh on the back of a bicycle.” She became a symbol of frivolity.]

[...]

[The article cites many similar examples.]

Archived link

Several videos shared online by Foxconn workers in Zhengzhou, Henan province, depict workers fainting due to long hours of overtime work in October. Given the demanding schedules, workers asked,

On 8 October, a video on Douyin described a female worker being taken to the hospital after days of night work. Three days later, another video (which has since been removed) reported that two workers fainted in the F area of the Foxconn facility. Additionally, a video uploaded on 12 October (also removed) reported another incident of a worker fainting in a workshop. China Labour Bulletin was unable to verify whether these reported cases overlapped.

Foxconn factories in Henan have significantly extended working hours following the release of the new iPhone models, leading many workers to believe this contributed to recent fainting incidents.

[...]

Similar arrangements for longer working hours were also reported at Foxconn factories in Shenzhen, although no fainting incidents have been reported.

Archived link

As China continues to grapple with a shrinking population, new data from the Ministry of Civil Affairs reveals a significant decline in marriage registrations for the first nine months of 2024. Only 4.747 million couples registered their marriages nationwide during this period, marking a year-on-year decrease of 943,000 couples. These figures, highlighted in a Reuters analysis of official data, underscore the ongoing challenge the country faces in encouraging young people to marry and start families.

This trend is a setback for Chinese lawmakers who have been working to counteract the country’s population decline through policy interventions and cultural campaigns.

[...]

The drop in marriage registrations in 2024 follows an earlier increase observed in 2023, when 5.690 million couples registered to marry during the first nine months of the year. This year’s decrease signals a return to the downward trend China has experienced over the past decade. As marriage rates decline, so too do birth rates—a significant concern for a country with a rapidly aging population. Government data showed China’s birth rate dropped for a second consecutive year in 2023, prompting officials to launch initiatives to boost marriage and birth rates in major cities.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has emphasized the importance of reversing this trend. Recently, he called on Chinese women to play a “critical role” in family building, urging them to establish a “new trend of family” that aligns with the country’s demographic goals. His remarks reflect a broader government effort to revive traditional family structures while fostering a “new-era” culture that celebrates marriage and childbearing.

China’s economic climate is a primary driver behind the decline in marriage registrations. Many young adults are struggling to secure stable employment and affordable housing, which has caused them to delay or forego marriage altogether. Urban centers, particularly megacities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, have seen a significant rise in the cost of living, further deterring young couples from committing to long-term partnerships and family planning. The price of housing, healthcare, and education has soared, forcing many young adults to prioritize financial security over starting families.

[...]

Archived link

He Zongying, a female technician employed at a FinDreams Battery factory in Wuhan, a subsidiary of Chinese EV giant BYD, suffered verbal abuse and threats from a male colleague. She immediately reported the issue to the company and also contacted the police. But, to her surprise, the company initially refused to hand over the surveillance footage of the incident to authorities, provided her with no clear path to file a complaint, and then chose to fire her rather than pursue her claim.

Meanwhile, the official union tasked with protecting her rights remained silent. Thus, despite the company’s stated commitment to corporate responsibility, its mechanisms for resolving claims of harassment proved not only ineffective but even resulted in the victim being punished by the company for raising the issue in the first place.

[...]

[Later on], she was called into a meeting with two male colleagues from the factory and a female staff member from Human Resources. But, instead of addressing her complaint, the meeting resulted in He being written up for two violations of company policy. To add insult to injury, one of these violations even stated that she had humiliated and verbally abused the man who had harassed her. She expressed her confusion, pointing out that the incident was on tape and asking why her attempt to stop his harassment was now being characterised as “humiliation and abuse.” In response, her supervisor merely stated that she could have handled the situation differently.

[...]

The second penalty He Zongying received was for exhibiting “improper conduct” and engaging in “repeated misbehaviour within a three-month period.” In addition to the initial altercation, this penalty also involved He allegedly leaving her workstation without authorisation on other occasions.

[...]

Over the following week or so, she was instructed to await further notice and was told that she needed not come into work. When she was finally instructed to return, however, she found that she had been removed from all technical tasks and instead given janitorial duties. Meanwhile, all the days she had been forced to take off by the company had been deducted from her salary.

[...]

BYD Contradicts its own Corporate Responsibility Policies, Union Offers No Support

In its labour rights protection policy, FinDreams Battery states that employees are valuable assets and offers various channels through which employees can provide feedback. The company’s 2023 “Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance Report” even outlines specific complaint mechanisms and mental health support services offered to workers. The parent firm BYD has also stated in its own corporate responsibility statements that it “firmly opposes workplace violence and harassment.”

[...]

[Edit typo.]

Archived link

Chinese state-affiliated accounts bypass transparency efforts on social media by using cloaked accounts or brands, masking their connections to China’s government bodies. These accounts, which interact on social media platforms as though they were independent entities, are sometimes capable of reaching millions, and even pay to amplify their messages.

Examples of such accounts are legion. “Hi, this is GBA” looks like just a social media influencer on X with more than 85,000 followers, as does “Daily Bae,” which has 1.1 million followers on Facebook. Both are external propaganda brands run by Guangdong province, and clearly identified as such in official media reports.

As [China's president] Xi Jinping speaks of “building a more effective international communication system,” part of the message he conveyed this week during a collective study session of the Politburo, accounts like these, run not just by state media but by provincial and city-level international communication centers (ICCs), are a critical part of the strategy.

[...]

The account “China Says” looks unassuming enough. It has a blue check and nearly 190,000 followers on X. On Facebook, it has 3.9 million followers, and its posts sometimes get millions of views. The bio section for “China Says” on X claims that the account offers “exclusive insights” into China’s foreign policy. At times, these insights appear as paid ads in X feeds like yours and mine. Much of the content on “China Says” focuses on the innocent promotion of local cuisine. But at times the account takes a sharp turn into the political. It regularly hosts explainers, for example, on China’s view of the international political system.

[...]

In fact, “China Says” is operated by the Chinese Internet News Center (中国互联网新闻中心), an institution directly under China’s State Council Information Office (SCIO). The SCIO is essentially the same office as the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Propaganda Department — which means that this “news and media website,” as it is labeled on Facebook, is speaking from the very center of the Chinese party-state. And yet, quite unlike the account for China Daily, also under the SCIO, the account bears no “China state-controlled media” label.

[...]

“China Says” is one cloaked party-state account on X that has made good use of the platform’s marketing system. X Ads offer any account paid promotion for their content over a fixed period of time, allowing posts to maximize exposure — acquiring followers and engagement more quickly. The tool also allows campaigns to target audiences, according to which country they are in and if they have followed certain Twitter accounts.

[...]

The list of those to target also includes anyone following a long list of Chinese X accounts, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the People’s Daily, CGTN, China Daily, The Paper — and even Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post, which in 2015 was bought by Alibaba Group.

[...]

China Says is also a concrete case study on what Xi Jinping meant when he spoke about the "pattern reconstruction of international communication," and about "innovative online external propaganda."

[...]

Be ready for stunning views of stony Tibetan peaks, followed by soft and playful pandas, and then a serving of anti-Western propaganda. It could come at you from anywhere.

Archived link

One of China’s biggest challenges today is its unprecedented low birth rate that threatens its economic development, especially given the country’s unsustainable pension system that is expected to be financially unviable by 2035. Besides this, the system shows wide discrepancies between northern and southern Chinese regions, which stems from their different economic development models. And while Chinese authorities continue to adopt and implement multiple policies aimed at boosting marriage and birth rates, Chinese citizens are increasingly disengaging from the party-state.

**A Propaganda Machine Stuck in the Past **

By all standards, China is a surveillance state that uses social credit, face recognition AI and other means to control its own population. From 1980 to 2015, Beijing successfully imposed its infamous One-Child Policy that led to effective population control. [...] Indeed, the combination of strict birth control and economic opening-up did lead to a dramatic improvement in living standards.

At the same time, Beijing showed that it would stop at nothing to enforce its coercive measures that included hefty fines in rural areas, forced abortions at late stages, and even forced sterilization. The One-Child Policy also resulted in an alarming gender gap, with over 30 million women gone missing, which has led to large-scale trafficking from other Asian countries.

Today, the challenge is the opposite of the situation in the early 1980s: China needs more children. China’s birth rate hit its lowest in 2023, with 6.2 children per 1,000 inhabitants, nearing the figures in Japan and South Korea.

[...]

Faced with a record low birth rate, Beijing finds itself caught in its own narrative. As suggested by [the state-controlled media outlet] Global Times article: “China regards the people’s right to subsistence and development as its top priority.” However, the Chinese people are long past the level of ‘subsistence’ this refers to, and the people are now seeking security amid a crumbling system. And while it is too early to talk about a ‘parallel’ society that exists outside the system in China, the society’s refusal to comply with state policies that are essential to the party’s survival is already an indication of a larger crack in the system.

Historians in China need to play a dual role. Not only do they contribute to the advancement of knowledge, but they also need to actively defend their country’s national interests in the South China Sea. According to a report by the South China Morning Post, Chinese scholars gathered at the end of June were urged to “give a forceful response to false narratives” to strengthen their nation’s claims in the South China Sea.

At the seminar held in Hainan Province, China, Wu Shicun, founder of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, emphasised the critical importance of “narrative construction and discourse building” for China. He said that the strategy would effectively defend the nation’s rights and interests in the South China Sea.

China asserts its claim to more than three million square kilometres of the Sea through the “nine-dash line” concept – contrary to international law. History has become a battleground in the dispute waters. Beijing has sought to draw upon the Western Han dynasty (200BCE to 9CE) to illustrate that China has historically fished in the waters for thousands of years. Yet a 2016 international tribunal decision on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea did not concur, concluding that there was no legal basis for China’s historic rights claim.

[...]

Propaganda based on China’s history may also be directed at individuals who are not Chinese citizens. It is reasonable to anticipate that China’s interpretation of the South China Sea history will be taught in mainland China’s universities, where international students are pursuing their degrees. China may also choose to communicate this interpretation to the international community through public diplomacy channels that it has established globally.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://feddit.org/post/4327016

Australia is reportedly set to boost its missile defence capabilities after the recent Chinese test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the South Pacific, which has raised "significant concerns" in Canberra as the Indo-Pacific region enters a "missile age".

In a speech on Wednesday, Australian Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy was quoted as saying by international news agencies [...] that his country plans to increase its missile defence and long-range strike capabilities. Conroy added that Australia will cooperate with its security partners -- the United States (US), Japan, and South Korea -- on issues of regional stability.

Why does Australia need more missiles?

"Why do we need more missiles?," posing this question, Conroy answered before the National Press Club in Canberra that "strategic competition" between the US and China "is a primary feature of Australia's security environment".

Conroy added that that competition is "at its sharpest in our region", the Indo-Pacific, which is on the cusp of a new missile age, where missiles will also serve as "tools of coercion".

[...]

• Chinese citizens' seemingly popular attitudes toward their government as party propaganda gained in direct surveys -and covered by China Central Television, Xinhua, China Global Television Network, China Dailyand other state-controlled outlets- provide a false narrative as survey respondents conceal their opposition to the regime due to the threat of repression.
• Deeper analyses find that Chinese citizens are far more fearful of expressing opposition to the regime under its leader Xi Jinping than in other autocracies, suggesting that observers should be sceptical about public opinion surveys in China that rely on direct questioning.
• The [Chinese Communist Party] CCP’s sprawling internal security apparatus compels citizens to engage in widespread self-censorship, at a rate nearly three times higher than in Vladamir Putin’s Russia.
• Researcher say the CCP confronts widespread frustration. Its recent policies, including the increase in repression and sabre-rattling over Taiwan, should be seen as an effort to contain this frustration.

[Edit typo.]